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Continued from above post...

02:10:38 (Robert) Doucement!

Gently !

Bonin eases the back pressure on the stick, and the plane gains speed as its climb becomes more shallow. It accelerates to 223 knots.
The stall warning falls silent. For a moment, the co-pilots are in control of the airplane.

02:10:41(Bonin) On est en… ouais, on est en "climb."

We're... yeah, we're in a climb.

Yet, still, Bonin does not lower the nose.

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, Robert pushes a button to summon the captain.

02:10:49 (Robert) Putain, il est où... euh?

Damn it, where is he?


The plane has climbed to 2512 feet above its initial altitude, and though it is still ascending at a dangerously high rate, it is flying within its acceptable envelope.

But for reasons unknown . . Bonin once again . . increases his back pressure on the stick, raising the nose of the plane and bleeding off speed. Again, the stall alarm begins to sound.

Still, the pilots continue to ignore it, and the reason may be that they believe it is impossible for them to stall the airplane. It's not an entirely unreasonable idea: The Airbus is a fly-by-wire plane; the control inputs are not fed directly to the control surfaces, but to a computer, which then in turn commands actuators that move the ailerons, rudder, elevator, and flaps.

The vast majority of the time, the computer operates within what's known as normal law, which means that the computer will not enact any control movements that would cause the plane to leave its flight envelope. "You can't stall the airplane in normal law," says Godfrey Camilleri, a flight instructor who teaches Airbus 330 systems to US Airways pilots.

But once the computer lost its airspeed data, the computer disconnected the autopilot and switched from normal law to "alternate law," a regime with far fewer restrictions on what a pilot can do.
"Once you're in alternate law, you can stall the airplane," Camilleri says.

It's quite possible that Bonin had never flown an airplane in alternate law, or understood its lack of restrictions. According to Camilleri, not one of US Airway's 17 Airbus 330s has ever been in alternate law.

Therefore, Bonin may have assumed that the stall warning was spurious because he didn't realize that the plane could remove its own restrictions against stalling and, indeed, had done so.

02:10:55 (Robert) Putain!

Damn it !

Another of the pitot tubes begins to function once more. The cockpit's avionics are now all functioning normally. The flight crew has all the information that they need to fly safely, and all the systems are fully functional.

The problems that occur from this point forward are entirely due to human error.

02:11:03 (Bonin) Je suis en TOGA, hein?

I'm in TOGA, huh?

Bonin's statement here offers a crucial window onto his reasoning.

TOGA is an acronym for Take Off, Go Around. When a plane is taking off or aborting a landing—"going around"—it must gain both speed and altitude as efficiently as possible. At this critical phase of flight, pilots are trained to increase engine speed to the TOGA level and raise the nose to a certain pitch angle.

Clearly, here Bonin is trying to achieve the same effect : He wants to increase speed and to climb away from perceived danger.

But he is not at sea level.

He is in the far thinner air of 37,500 feet. The engines generate less thrust here, and the wings generate less lift. Raising the nose to a certain angle of pitch does not result in the same angle of climb, but far less.

Indeed, it can—and will—result in a descent.

While Bonin's behavior is irrational, it is not inexplicable.

Intense psychological stress [ a high degree of personal fear ] tends to shut down the part of the brain responsible for innovative, creative thought. Instead, we tend to revert to the familiar and well-rehearsed.

Though pilots are required to practice hand-flying their aircraft during all phases of flight as part of re- current training, in their daily routine they do most of their hand-flying at low altitude—while taking off, landing, and maneuvering.

It's not surprising, then, that amid the frightening disorientation of the thunderstorm, Bonin reverted to flying the plane as if it had been close to the ground.

Even though his response was totally ill-suited to the situation.

02:11:06 (Robert) Putain, il vient ou il vient pas?

Damn it, is he coming or not?

The plane now reaches its maximum altitude. With engines at full power, the nose pitched upward at an angle of 18 degrees, it moves horizontally for an instant.

Then the Airbus begins . . to sink back toward the ocean.

02:11:21 (Robert) On a pourtant les moteurs! Qu'est-ce qui se passe bordel? Je ne comprends pas ce que se passe.
We still have the engines ! What the hell is happening ? I don't understand what's happening.

Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. "If the person in the right seat is pulling back on the joystick, the person in the left seat doesn't feel it," says Dr. David Esser, a professor of aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other [ stick ] does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the other one turns the same way."

Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on his side stick.

The men are utterly failing to engage in an important process known as crew resource management, or CRM. They are failing, essentially, to cooperate. It is not clear to either one of them who is responsible for what, and who is doing what. This is a natural result of having two co-pilots flying the plane. " When you have a captain and a first officer in the cockpit, it's clear who's in charge," Nutter explains. "
The captain has command authority. He's legally responsible for the safety of the flight.

But when you put two first officers up front, it changes things.
You don't have the sort of traditional discipline imposed on the flight deck when you have a captain."

The vertical speed toward the ocean accelerates. If Bonin were to let go of the controls, the nose would fall and the plane would regain forward speed. But because he is holding the stick all the way back, the nose remains high and the plane has barely enough forward speed for the controls to be effective. As turbulence continues to buffet the plane, it is nearly impossible to keep the wings level.

02:11:32 (Bonin) Putain, j'ai plus le contrôle de l'avion, là! J'ai plus le contrôle de l'avion!

Damn it, I don't have control of the plane, I don't have control of the plane at all!

02:11:37 (Robert) Commandes à gauche !

Left seat taking control !

At last, the more senior of the pilots (and the one who seems to have a somewhat better grasp of the situation) now takes control of the airplane.

Unfortunately, he, too, seems unaware of the fact that the plane is now stalled, and pulls back on the stick as well. Although the plane's nose is pitched up, the aircraft is descending at a 40-degree angle.
The stall warning continues to sound.

At any rate, Bonin soon after takes back the controls.

A minute and a half after the crisis began, the captain returns to the cockpit. The stall warning continues to blare.

02:11:43 ( Captain ) Eh… Qu'est-ce que vous foutez?

What the hell are you doing?

02:11:45 (Bonin) On perd le contrôle de l'avion, là!

We've lost control of the plane !

02:11:47 (Robert) On a totalement perdu le contrôle de l'avion... On comprend rien... On a tout tenté...


We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at all...
We've tried everything.

By now the plane has returned to its initial altitude but is
falling fast. With its nose pitched 15 degrees up, and a forward speed
of 100 knots, it is descending at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute, at
an angle of 41.5 degrees. It will maintain this attitude with little
variation all the way to the sea.

Though the pitot tubes are now fully functional, the forward
airspeed is so low—below 60 knots—that the angle-of-attack inputs are
no longer accepted as valid, and the stall-warning horn temporarily
stops. This may give the pilots the impression that their situation is
improving, when in fact it signals just the reverse.

Another of the revelations of Otelli's transcript is that the
captain of the flight makes no attempt to physically take control of
the airplane.

Had Dubois done so, he almost certainly would have understood, as a
pilot with many hours flying light airplanes, the insanity of pulling
back on the controls while stalled.

But instead, he takes a seat behind the other two pilots.

This, experts say, is not so hard to understand. "They were
probably experiencing some pretty wild gyrations," Esser says. "In a
condition like that, he might not necessarily want to make the
situation worse by having one of the crew members actually disengage
and stand up. He was probably in a better position to observe and give
his commands from the seat behind."

But from his seat, Dubois is unable to infer from the instrument
displays in front of him why the plane is behav-ing as it is. The
critical missing piece of information : the fact that someone has been
holding the controls all the way back for virtually the entire time. No
one has told Dubois, and he hasn't thought to ask.

02:12:14 (Robert) Qu'est-ce que tu en penses ? Qu'est-ce que tu en
penses? Qu'est-ce qu'il faut faire ?

What do you think ? What do you think ? What should we do ?

02:12:15 ( Captain ) Alors, là, je ne sais pas!

Well, I don't know !

As the stall warning continues to blare, the three pilots discuss
the situation with no hint of understanding the nature of their
problem.

No one mentions the word "stall."

As the plane is buffeted by turbulence, the captain urges Bonin to
level the wings—advice that does nothing to address their main problem.
The men briefly discuss, incredibly, whether they are in fact climbing
or descending, before agreeing that they are indeed descending.

As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take over the
controls, and he pushes forward on his stick.

But the plane is in "dual pilot input" mode.

So the computer is averaging his forward stick inputs with those of
Bonin . . who continues to pull back.

So the nose remained at its high angle of attack.

02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...

Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure !


But I've had my stick . . back . . the whole time !

At last.

Bonin tells the others that crucial fact . . he had so grievously
failed to understand . . himself.

02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.

No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Alors descends... Alors, donne-moi les commandes... À
moi les commandes!

Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!

Bonin yields the controls, and Robert finally puts the nose down. The
plane begins to regain speed. But it is still descending at a
precipitous dive angle.

As they near 2000 feet, the aircraft's sensors detect the
fast-approaching surface and trigger a new alarm.

There is no time left to build up airspeed speed by pushing the plane's
nose forward into a dive.

At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again pulls his
elevator control stick . . all the way back.

02:14:23 (Robert) Putain, on va taper... C'est pas vrai !


Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!

02:14:25 (Bonin) Mais qu'est-ce que se passe?

What's happening?

02:14:27 (Captain) 10 degrès d'assiette...

Ten degrees of pitch...

Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops.

= Comments :

Today the Air France 447 transcripts yield information that may
ensure that no airline pilot will ever again make those same mistakes.
From now on, every airline pilot will no doubt think immediately of
AF447 . . the instant a stall-warning alarm sounds . . at cruise
altitude.

Airlines around the world will change their training programs to
enforce habits that might have saved the doomed airliner: paying closer
attention to the weather and to what the planes around you are doing ;
explicitly clarifying who's in charge when two co-pilots are alone in
the cockpit ; completely under-standing the parameters of alternate law.

And practicing to hand-fly the airplane . . during all phases of
flight.

But the crash raises the disturbing possibility that aviation may
well long be plagued by a subtler menace, one that ironically
springs from the never-ending quest to make flying safer.

Over the decades, airliners have been built with increasingly
automated flight-control functions. These have the potential to remove
a great deal of uncertainty and danger from aviation.

BUT they also remove important information from the flight crew's
attention. While the airplane's avionics track crucial parameters such
as location, speed, and heading, the human beings can pay attention to
something else.

But when trouble suddenly springs up and the computer decides that
it can no longer cope—on a dark night, perhaps, in turbulence, far from
land—the humans might find themselves with a very incomplete notion of
what's going on.

They'll wonder : What instruments are reliable, and which can't be
trusted ? What's the most pressing threat ? What's going on ?
Unfortunately, the vast majority of pilots will have little experience
in finding the answers.

Jeff Wise [ abridged ] is a contributing editor for Popular Mechanics
and the author of Extreme Fear : The Science of Your Mind . . In
Danger.

For a daily dose of extreme fear, check out his blog.

Read more: Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really
Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics